



# CSIRO ISS Seminar Series

CSIRO ICT Centre, 18 November 2004

## Decentralised coordination of distributed power system resources using evolutionary programming

Dr Iain MacGill

*Research coordinator - Engineering*

Centre for Energy and Environmental Markets

*Senior Lecturer*

School of Electrical Engineering and Telecommunications

The University of New South Wales

[i.macgill@unsw.edu.au](mailto:i.macgill@unsw.edu.au)

[www.ceem.unsw.edu.au](http://www.ceem.unsw.edu.au)

# UNSW Centre for Energy + Environmental Markets

## *Established...*

- *to formalise* growing interest + interactions between UNSW researchers in Engineering, Commerce + Economics... + more
- *through UNSW Centre* providing Australian research leadership in interdisciplinary design, analysis + performance monitoring of energy + environmental markets, associated policy frameworks
- *in the areas of*
  - Physical energy markets (with an initial focus on ancillary services, spot market + network services for electricity + gas)
  - Energy-related derivative markets (financial + environmental including interactions between derivative and physical markets)
  - Policy frameworks and instruments in energy and environment
  - Economic valuation methodologies
  - **Experimental market platforms and AI ‘intelligent agent’ techniques to aid in energy + environmental market design**

# Tools for assessing market design + structure

- Economics – eg. general competitive market theory
- Experience with existing, similar markets
- ‘Common-sense’ assessment
- Mathematical analysis – Cournot + Bertrand paradigms, game theory...
- **Experiments**
  - Field trials, demonstration programs
  - Simulation
    - ‘Trial + error’ simulations to explore possible outcomes
    - Simulations guided by ‘intelligent’ market participants
      - Experimental subjects*
      - Intelligent software agents***

# The emerging electricity industry

- Drivers
  - Market oriented restructuring now underway in much of the world
  - Growing potential of distributed resources
  - Increasingly pressing environmental concerns
- Outcomes for power systems
  - Likely increasingly physically distributed – many smaller-scale generation and active demand-side resources
  - More organisationally decentralised – decision making devolved to far greater numbers and diversity of industry participants

# Traditional power system operation


- Operation to minimise the risk-weighted cost of electricity supply to meet given demand + required level of security
  - Approximate time scales of 5 min to a year
- Challenges
  - Physical power system characteristics: *supply/demand* balance at all times in all locations, no cost-effective storage
  - Complex resources characteristics
    - Stochastic behaviour
    - Inter-temporal links (eg. Hydro, ramp rates)
- *Analysis tools*
  - Use time decomposition – economic dispatch, unit commitment, fuel scheduling (inter-temporal links are key challenge)
  - LP, DP, Lagrangian Relaxation, GA....
  - => Centralised dispatch solutions for a small number of large supply-side resources

# Decentralised power system coordination

- Emerging challenges with distributed resources + decentralisation
  - Potentially far greater numbers
  - Demand-side resources (eg. Load management)
  - More variable + stochastic resources (eg. Wind, PV)
  - *Independent participants with individual objectives*
- Options for power system operation
  - *Traditional centralised control* (DRs treated as uncontrolled variation)
  - *Centralised control* with spot pricing – DRs can self-dispatch
  - *Decentralised coordination* – resources can actively direct dispatch via
    - Bilateral contracting
    - **Electricity spot markets**
- New types of analysis tools reqd
  - Individual participant behaviour
  - Market coordination – design (rules) + structure of markets


# Power system model

- Resources – ITLs (state), stochastic behaviour (Markov chains), aggregations of different plant (eg. Hydro + thermal)
- Network – single bus, radial network with transport model...
- Agents – control resource, communicate with coordinator, social/individual obj
- System coordinator – max. declared benefits of energy trading s.t. constraints




# Agent model

- $b$  – benefit function wrt control actions  $u$
- $w$  – future benefit function wrt state  $x$
- $B$  – combined benefit function wrt elec. flow  $q$
- $d$  – declared benefit function wrt  $q$






# Agent model over time horizon




# Solving agent/system behaviour: *Evolutionary Programming*

- General process for evolving good solutions to problems




# Dual Evolutionary Programming: *evolutionary population*




# Dual Evolutionary Programming: *evolving solutions*

- Solve ‘optimal’ agent behaviours via repeated power system simulations, and evolution of best agent behaviours




# Example: Socially optimal PS coordination

- Agents seeking to achieve system optimal operation  
=> Declare true benefit functions to market coordinator



# Socially optimal market coordination


- Agents' benefit functions are dispatched to max. benefits of energy trading



# The challenge with resources that have ITLs


- Benefit function for energy storage depends on other system resources + behaviour over time (eg. daily load profile)

- Example: hydro generating plant with pump storage
  - Value of energy (water) in storage depends on present + **future** spot market dispatches (typically value declines as more stored energy available)
  - Plant may bid to *buy* as well as offer to *sell*




# Participant with hydro + thermal plant

- Submit a market offer that reflects benefits of thermal plant + present value of hydro (wrt current water level)






# Parameterised *future value* 'solution' for hydro




# Evolutionary pop. of feasible agent behaviours




# Solve optimal agent behaviour

- Run repeated power system simulations with evolving sets of agent behaviours to max system benefit




# A simple example

- Five system storages – solar plant with thermal storage, two loads with thermal storage (one high loss), pumped hydro, battery storage






# Optimal system operation




# Example: socially optimal PS operation with (aggregated) stochastic PV + load storage




# Modelling PV

- Use markov chains linking a number of daily profile 'states'



# Modelling (aggregated) load storage


- Models can include time varying electrical demand, effective storage capacities, charging rates, charging/discharging losses, leakage






# Information scenarios for load agents

- None
- Knowledge of PV state => evolve two state controller
- Knowledge of *other* storage states => eg. low, medium, high => evolve three state controller
- Knowledge of PV and other storage state => evolve six state controller






# Optimal load operation





# Potential synergies between PV + load storage



# Example: competitive spot markets

- Agents pursue individual profit-maximising objectives. Opportunities for strategic behaviour (ie. not submitting true benefit function) depends on market design + structure

---

## Strategic behaviour within market

## *Solution techniques*

---

None

*Inspection for simple systems,  
LP etc for more complex problems*

Single participant only  
(or other offers known)


*Inspection for simple systems,  
LP etc for more complex problems*

More than one participant


*Game theoretic analysis for some  
simple problems (2-3 players)  
**Dual evolutionary programming***

# Agent for a participant with 2 thermal generators


- Agent uses physical plant costs + **strategic reasoning** to determine market offer
  - Assume linear cost curves for gens, no inter-temporal links



# Parameterised market offer 'solution' for an agent




# A population of offer 'solutions' for each agent



# Participants with inter-temporal links


- Example: hydro generating plant with pump storage
  - Value of energy (water) in storage **for participant** depends on present + future spot market dispatches

$$\frac{\partial W_n}{\partial x_n} \quad (\$/MWh)$$






# Parameterised *future value* 'solution' for hydro agent




# Population of bid/offer solutions for hydro participant



# Evolve population of offer 'solutions' for each agent


- Progressive tournament – ‘all against best’
  - Agent tests and ranks its offers population against ‘best’ of other agents => selection + recombination + random variation
  - Next agent’s turn
  - *Tournament continues...*



# Studies of strategic behaviour in spot markets




- 2 generator problems
  - EP gives same answers as game theory for simple problems
  - Useful insights with problems where game theory may struggle – eg. if either gen can fully supply load => no Nash equilibrium
  - EP can handle networks, complex plant operation (if you can simulate power system operation, then can use EP)
- Multiple generators including hydro
  - Useful insights into possible participant strategies, mkt impacts
  - Results not tested against other solutions – no tools available..
- Complex industry structures – 5+ generators
  - Useful insights into possible participant strategies, mkt impacts
  - Results not tested against other solutions – no tools available..
- Stochastic generating plant
  - Prelim. work using Markov chains to model stochastic hydro flows

# Example: 2 generators including Hydro






# 2 + Hydro: EP Results




## 2 + Hydro: EP Results – participant profits

- Surplus (profit) for participants with none, either and both undertaking strategic behaviour



# Example: EP Results – 5 generators including hydro

- Surplus (profit) for participants with none, one only and all using strategic behaviour





# Summary - potential value of DEP

- Can have complex, realistic
  - resource models – if you can simulate operation, you can probably find ‘good’ behaviour using DEP
  - objective functions – risk weighted, individual, aggregated, socially optimal
  - Agents – eg. Contract positions, etc
  - Complex information scenarios
  - Stochastic resources (markov chains + longer simulations)
- However
  - Computational burden can expand rapidly, particularly with stochastic resources, multiple controller states

# Next steps

- ARC funded project – AGSM and Elec. Engineering
  - \$250K for three years: 2004-7
  - Will explore analytical and EP tools for understanding participant behaviour in spot + derivative electricity markets
- **CEEM**
  - DEP tools for exploring market design + structure
  - Comparison / validation of EP with Exptl Economics findings
  - Agent support for experimental subjects with complex market designs + structures



For more information.....

[www.ceem.unsw.edu.au](http://www.ceem.unsw.edu.au)