



An Overview of the Spanish Electrical System and its Liberalisation


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Based on previous presentation from I. Pérez-Arriaga & C. Batlle


Contents



- Basic data on the Spanish Electrical System
- Regulatory framework
- Successes and flaws


Spanish evolution: last 10 years

- 10% population growth (mainly immigration)
- 44% GDP growth (average of ~4%/year)
- 56% energy consumption growth (average of ~5%/year)
- 72% hourly peak demand growth (average of ~5.5%/year)





Evolution of installed capacity

- CCGTs and Wind are almost the only ones being installed:
 - >12 GW of CCGT and >9 GW of wind out of 27 GW growth




Installed capacity December 2005




Energy production mix evolution

- Due to demand growth and droughts, coal-fired generation is not really reducing its output




Energy mix today (year 2005)



Contents

- Basic data on the Spanish Electrical System
- Regulatory framework
 - Restructuring process
 - Market design
- Successes and flaws



Restructuring process: initial situation

- Fully private but for the system operator (REE)
 - Smooth transition: traditionally private companies, a few partially owned by public institutions
- Already had an independent SO (since 1984)
- Wealthy electrical utilities
- Good service quality
- Good reserve margin
- Previous regulation tended to micro-regulation


Restructuring process: main decisions

- National champions (will come back to this subject later)
 - Foreseeing a European energy market
- Vertical integration: legal separation between different activities, but no limitation to ownership
- *Red Eléctrica de España* (REE): system operator, transmission network owner and manager
<http://www.ree.es/>
- *Operador del Mercado Eléctrico* (OMEL): market operator, newly created
<http://www.omel.es/>
- Wholesale market (not mandatory)
- Explicit support to renewable energy sources and CHP (through a *Special Regime*)

Wholesale market design

- Both demand and generation make bids to the market
- Hourly market
- Sequence of different markets until real time is reached
- No derivatives markets
 - In the future there will be a market involving Portugal
- Freedom for international exchanges (within congestion limits)

Wholesale market structure



Wholesale market: ancillary services

- Mandatory services
 - Primary reserve (speed control)
 - Reactive control
- Non-mandatory services
 - Secondary reserve (AGC)
 - Band and energy up to 15 minutes
 - Control areas: each utility has one
 - Tertiary reserve
 - Available in 15 minutes and maintained for 2 hours
 - Marginal price
 - Black-out start
 - Additional reactive support
- Costs fully assigned to agents that deviate from their bid


Special Regime

- Feed-in-tariff
 - Distribution companies have to buy their production
 - Under 10 MW
 - No mandatory production forecast
 - Implies costs to distribution companies
 - Over 10 MW
 - Mandatory production forecast
 - Penalisation if deviation bigger than a threshold
- Market access + premium
 - Meant to lead to a better market integration
 - Most wind generators have switched to the market (high prices)

Energy price composition

Last year annual average price (sept04-sept05)

Total: 5.59 c€/kWh = 8.95 c\$/kWh



Restructuring: Spanish peculiarities

- Generation
 - Capacity payments
 - Stranded costs
- Regulated tariff
- Gradual gas liberalisation
 - Gas CHP subsidised during 10 years

Capacity payments

- Additional payment on top of market price
 - Meant to encourage new entrants and delay closure of old facilities
- Generators are paid based on
 - Long term reliability (estimated contribution to long term system reliability)
 - Real short term reliability
 - Technical availability, maintenance, hydro reserves management
- Actual payment was very high
 - Has been reduced 2 times
 - It was 25% of market incomes (now 8% partially due to price surges)
 - There is no real incentive for high reliability


Generation stranded costs

- Paid as the difference between market price and a fixed estimated price used to calculate the regulated tariff (6 c\$/kWh)
 - Interference with the market
 - Has stabilised the price in the past few years
- It has been used as a buffer to settle any other cost deviation
- The total amount to be paid has been under discussion since it was decided
 - Final payments were stopped last year
 - This decision, among other factors, has led to an increase of 72% in the 2005 average market price over 2004

Regulated tariff

- No published methodology to calculate the tariffs
 - Incoherence between access tariffs and full tariffs
- Energy cost included in full tariffs is based on the estimated wholesale market price set at 6 c\$/kWh
 - Demand growth has allowed a reduction of regulated tariffs in the last 10 years, despite (increasing) extra costs of Special Regime (1.5 b€/year)
 - Due to energy price growth (last 2 years), there is a tariff deficit
 - Distribution companies are supporting it
 - Generation companies get large profits
 - Most companies are vertically integrated
 - Even though distribution companies are entitled to receive this tariff deficit, the government is reluctant to pay it
 - Specially now that E.ON wants to buy ENDESA


Regulated tariff



Source: CNE

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- Basic data on the Spanish Electrical System
- Regulatory framework
- Successes and flaws



Successes

- Smooth transition
- Market design doesn't seem to have big flaws
 - No major problem with system security
 - Ancillary services have worked well
 - Normal operation, easy and cheap implementation
 - Security of the system has not been jeopardised
 - Network restrictions management has been criticised (and changed lately)
 - White Book has been published recently
- Transmission regulation
 - Simple and traditional, but without problems
- Wind
 - High penetration of wind energy (10 GW and 8% of total energy)

Flaws (i)


- Horizontal concentration (national champions)
 - Possible price manipulation
 - Market price is not credible
- Stranded costs problem
 - Interference with the market
- Long term capacity reliability
- Lack of a tariff design methodology
- Distribution remuneration
 - Urgent need to develop a viable and quality related regulation

Flaws (ii)

- Need of an effective retail market liberalisation
 - Tariff methodology
 - Credible market price
- Need to increase gas market liberalisation
 - Government is promoting or at least allowing “diagonal” concentration (gas & electricity)
- Environmental sustainability
 - Energy efficiency: complete lack of demand side management
 - CO₂ ETS (45% increase vs. 15%)
 - Higher renewable energy sources penetration
 - Biomass
 - Solar (PV and thermal)

Horizontal concentration


- Initial structure



(*) IMPORTS AND OTHERS


Horizontal concentration

- Last years



(*) IMPORTS AND OTHERS

International exchanges (ii)



National champions

- ENDESA Group was created after liberalisation
 - Merger of all the electric companies with any public ownership
- Today (i)
 - Gas Natural (former Spanish gas monopolist) has made a take-over bid for ENDESA
 - Spanish international strategy (national champion) and regional equilibrium
 - Gas Natural is 1/3 of ENDESA but indirectly under public control

National champions

- Today (ii)
 - E.ON has made a higher takeover bid for ENDESA
 - Spanish government has publicly opposed this offer
 - Published two Royal Decrees to
 - Enhance the Regulatory Commission's powers to judge the transaction
 - Recover costs of given CO2 emission permits and oblige vertical integrated companies to sell to their distribution company “standard price” energy

National champions in Europe

- Germany
 - E.ON was allowed to merge with RHEGAS in order to build a big German company that would be able to compete with EDF
- France
 - Protects EDF in France
 - Is promoting now a merger between GDF (French gas monopolist) and Suez (French services company) to create a new French giant energy company
 - Suez owns Electrabel (Belgium utility)
 - ENEL (Italian utility) was preparing a takeover bid for Suez



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Thank you for your attention


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Contents



- Some additional slides that contain some useful information

Spain today (i)


- **Situated South West of Europe**
 - Total area 505,000 km² (NSW ~800,000 km²)
 - Population: 44 million
- **Economic data:**
 - GDP: \$1,340 b (837 b€)
\$31,155 /capita (19,472 €/capita)
 - Australia: ~\$875 b
~\$43,670 /capita
- **Electrical data:**
 - Peak demand: ~43,000 MW
 - Energy consumption: 243 TWh (5.6 MWh/year&capita)
 - Australia: 192 TWh (9.6 MWh/year&capita)

Spain today (ii)

- **Electrical data:**
 - Installed generation capacity: ~73 GW (Dec 2005)
 - Transmission network
 - 400kV: 16,800 km
 - 220&132kV: 16,000 km
 - Customers
 - ~23,000,000 LV customers (~47% energy consumption)
 - ~65,000 HV customers (~53% energy consumption)

Spanish evolution

- Reserve margin reached its minimum in 2001
 - 1.26 without Special Regime (same as in 2005)
 - 1.58 with Special Regime



Spanish future installed capacity

- If all the generation plants that are planned today (at any stage of the administrative process) are built in the next 5 years, there will be around
 - 20 GW of additional wind (~30 GW in total)
 - 16 GW of additional CCGT (~28 GW in total)
 - + rest of Special Regime technologies
 - Biomass
 - Solar thermal
 - Solar Photovoltaic
 - Etc.

Restructuring process: acceptance


- Shareholders: stranded costs acknowledgement
- Customers: regulated tariff reduction
- Primary energy suppliers:
 - 10 years of subsidies to Spanish coal mines
 - Gradual gas liberalisation
- CHP generators:
 - 10 years of gas subsidies

Wholesale market: characteristics

- Every transaction is considered firm
- Each market has an independent price
- Day ahead market: price-quantity bid for each hour of next day
 - Each hour has its own marginal price
- Intra-day markets: same, but for increments over the day-ahead market transactions
- Congestion management
- Reserves markets
- The SO is able to call for a deviation market if needed

Retail market


- Fully liberalised since 1/1/2003
 - Retail market was liberalised in several steps



- There is still the option to remain at a regulated retail tariff through incumbent distribution companies
- Few customers have switched to a liberalised retailer
- (!) Regulated retail tariff does not reflect actual generation prices, which means that retailers will lose all the customers they gained in the past years

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 - Market design
 - Other activities
 - Transmission
 - Distribution
- Successes, flaws and future evolution



Transmission: new investments

- The SO proposes an expansion plan
 - Does not know anymore where the generation facilities will be connected
- The regulator approves the plan and...
 - ...construction, operation and maintenance is assigned
 - through competitive offers (regulation not yet completely developed)
 - directly in special cases

Transmission: losses

- The SO (REE) calculates loss factors in each node
 - based on marginal losses
 - normalised to match the cost of losses
- Each generator production or demand consumption is adjusted with this factor in the wholesale market
 - A generator connected to an exporting node can only sell less energy than it produces (the loss factor will lower than 1)

Transmission: access

- Free access to the transmission network is guaranteed
- Customers
 - Have to pay for any special equipment
 - Access can be denied in one node if there is not enough capacity
 - Alternative nodes can be offered
- Generators
 - Have to build, operate and maintain all the needed equipment
 - Access is not denied if there is not enough capacity, even if conflicts with other generators arise
 - Network capacity reservation is not allowed

Transmission: congestions

- Spanish internal congestions
 - REE will solve the congestion using the generators bids
 - Any unmatched generator that produces because of technical reasons is paid their original bid price
 - Costs are fully assigned to those responsible for demand
- International congestions
 - *pro rata* between bilateral contracts and market bids
 - First-come-first-served

Distribution

- Global revenue cap
 - Unlinked to ongoing changes in real distribution costs
 - Each company has a fixed % of this amount, independently of changes to their market share
- Quality Regulation
 - Continuity of supply
 - Large individual limits (number and duration of long interruptions)
 - Individual compensation if threshold is reached
 - Large system limits (ASIDI and ASIFI)
 - Mandatory investment plans if threshold is reached
 - Partially financed by access tariffs
 - Commercial quality: some controls
 - Power quality: not yet developed

International exchanges (i)

